
Over the last two articles, I have been working through a simple question:
What does an FX risk-management program actually need to work in practice?
The first article looked at the hedge ratio.
A policy might say to hedge 80% of near-term exposure, 50% six months out, and 25% beyond that. The structure can be reasonable. But the precise numbers contain an assumption: that the underlying cash-flow forecast is reliable enough to support them.
That assumption can be measured.
The second article added another test.
Even if the hedge ratio is well calibrated, can the company actually execute it?
Does it have sufficient derivative credit capacity? What forward rate is it locking in? Could the hedge consume liquidity through collateral or settlement before the underlying commercial cash flow arrives?
Those questions led naturally to the next one:
What should an SME’s hedging policy actually contain?
So I put together a working FX hedging policy template for finance teams without a dedicated treasury function.
One thing about the template is worth explaining upfront.
Most of the important numbers are blank.
That is intentional.
It would have been easy to populate the document with something like:
Those numbers would make the template look more complete.
They would also create the wrong impression.
A company with contracted recurring USD revenues can support a relatively high hedge ratio several months forward.
Another company selling into the same market, in the same currency, may depend on a sales forecast that regularly moves by 30%.
The currencies may be identical.
The appropriate hedge ratios may not be.
That is why the template leaves parameters such as hedge ratios, tenor limits, de minimis thresholds, authorization limits and liquidity assumptions open.
Fill each in using information from your own business.
Filling in the blanks is the work.
Before deciding how much to hedge, the policy asks a more basic question:
What is the primary objective?
Is it protecting:
These objectives can overlap, but they are not identical.
For an importer that sells at a fixed local-currency price, protecting gross margin may be the central concern.
For a company with large foreign-currency receivables and payables already recognized on the balance sheet, earnings volatility from revaluation may matter more.
For another business, the priority is knowing how much domestic currency will be available to fund payroll, suppliers and debt service.
The policy should state that objective before it specifies the hedge.
Otherwise, it becomes difficult to determine later whether the program actually did what it was supposed to do.
The template also separates three types of exposure:
Recognized monetary exposure: invoices, receivables, payables, loans and other amounts already on the books.
Forecast cash-flow exposure: sales, purchases and other expected transactions that have not yet been recognized.
Translation exposure: the impact of translating foreign operations into the group’s reporting currency.
That distinction matters because the uncertainty is different.
If you have a USD 500,000 supplier invoice due in 30 days, the amount is largely known. The uncertainty may primarily be the exchange rate and exact settlement date.
If you expect USD 500,000 of sales six months from now, the currency exposure itself may still change.
Those two exposures should not automatically receive the same hedge ratio simply because both happen to be USD 500,000.
The template therefore requires classifying the exposure before applying the hedge ratio.
This is where the first article becomes part of the policy.
For forecast exposures, the template asks the finance team to archive historical forecast versions and compare them with what actually settled.
Not just once.
By currency, by direction and by horizon.
For example:
The objective is not to turn an SME finance team into a statistics department.
It is to replace an assumption with evidence.
If the business historically receives at least 70% of a particular forecast across most comparable periods, that is useful information when management discusses whether hedging 80% of that forecast is sensible.
It does not automatically make 70% the correct hedge ratio.
Risk appetite, margins, pricing, credit capacity and liquidity still matter.
But at least the conversation has a measurable starting point.
This brings in the second article.
Suppose the proposed hedge ratios imply USD 5 million of forwards over the next twelve months.
The next question is not only whether USD 5 million is the right economic hedge.
It is:
Can we execute it?
The template asks the finance team to document each counterparty’s derivative capacity and, importantly, how that capacity is actually calculated.
A USD 5 million forward does not necessarily consume USD 5 million of credit capacity. Banks may consider mark-to-market exposure, potential future exposure, tenor, netting arrangements, collateral and other factors.
So the finance team needs to ask the bank.
The template also makes forward pricing visible.
A forward rate is not simply today’s spot rate carried forward. Interest-rate differentials and other market factors affect the rate the company actually locks in.
For an SME, I would translate that into something management can understand:
What does this hedge do to the effective purchase price, sales margin, or cash flow in our reporting currency?
The same applies to collateral and settlement.
A hedge can be economically correct and still require cash at an inconvenient time.
That belongs in the policy before the trade is entered, not on the morning it settles.
Commercial cash flows rarely behave exactly as the policy spreadsheet expects.
A customer pays two weeks late.
A supplier invoice is smaller than forecast.
A shipment moves into the next month.
A large order is canceled.
The policy therefore needs rules for what happens next.
Do you roll the hedge?
Reduce it?
Close it?
Temporarily fund settlement?
Who has authority to decide?
At what point does a normal timing difference become an exception requiring approval?
These may seem like operational details.
They become much more important when a derivative is approaching settlement, and the commercial cash flow has moved.
The purpose of putting the rules into the policy is not to eliminate judgment.
It is to avoid making the same decision from scratch every time.
A textbook treasury policy might assume separate people for forecasting, dealing, confirmation, settlement, accounting and compliance.
Many SMEs do not have that staffing model.
Pretending otherwise does not create segregation of duties.
The template instead asks for a workable minimum.
The person executing a hedge should not be the only person checking that it was authorized, correctly priced and accurately recorded.
Where a second treasury professional does not exist, that review can move up to the CFO, controller, finance director, or another authorized person.
The control objective remains.
The operating model is scaled to the organization that actually exists.
There is one final principle I wanted the template to make explicit.
Suppose the company hedges a USD receivable at 1.30.
When the customer pays, spot is 1.35.
Did the company make a bad decision?
That question is only useful if the company’s objective was to predict the currency market.
For a risk-management program, the better question is:
Did the hedge reduce the uncertainty the company had decided it could not afford to take?
Performance should therefore be measured against the policy’s reference point — such as the budget rate, protected margin or cash-flow objective — rather than simply comparing the hedge with whatever spot happened to be on settlement day.
Otherwise, a risk-management program can quickly become a market-timing exercise.
That is not what the policy is designed to do.
The template covers more than hedge ratios.
It includes:
It also includes a parameter-derivation record, forecast-accuracy record, minimum hedge register and pre-trade checklist.
The objective is not to complicate FX risk management.
It is to make the decisions explicit.
For a smaller finance team, that matters because the same person may be forecasting the exposure, talking to the bank, executing the hedge and explaining the outcome to management.
A working policy provides the discipline around those decisions.
I would not recommend downloading this template, filling in a few benchmark hedge ratios and sending it to the board.
Start instead with the underlying questions.
What exposures are material?
How reliable are the forecasts?
How much risk can the business tolerate?
What capacity has the bank actually provided?
What rate are you locking in?
Could settlement or collateral create a liquidity problem?
Who is authorized to act when the underlying cash flow changes?
Then fill in the blanks.
That is when the document becomes your policy rather than someone else’s template.
Download the FX Hedging Policy Template.
Next week, I will follow this with a companion guide that works through several practical SME scenarios, including an importer protecting margin, an exporter whose forecast proves too optimistic, a natural hedge with a timing mismatch, a contingent contract, and a hedge constrained by bank capacity.
Because once the policy is written, the next question is the one that matters in practice:
What do we actually do when the situation in front of us does not look exactly like the policy example?